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I. Introduction and related literature
In recent years, the United States has been engaged in a heated debate about
whether to replace part of the current, defined benefit (DB) Social Security system with
a system of defined contribution (DC) personal accounts. In 2005, President Bush gave
speeches in numerous cities and towns advocating a reform that included these
individual accounts. Both proponents and opponents of individual accounts have
emphasized the stark differences between the current defined benefit system and a
system with individual accounts. The mechanics and outcomes of the two systems
seem to be quite different, and their goals are usually presented as diametrically
opposed.
Advocates of preserving the current system (predominantly Democrats) are
committed to four core goals that stem from regarding Social Security as social
insurance: (1) social security should redistribute wealth from those who have earned
more over their whole working lives to those who have earned less, (2) different
generations should share the risks of aggregate shocks, (3) workers should be insured
against inflation and long life with indexed life annuities, and (9) there should be limited
opportunity for individuals to make mistakes that would lower their standard of living
during retirement.
Advocates of shifting to a personal account system for Social Security
(predominantly Republicans) base their support on a commitment to a set of core goals
that stem from a desire for real social security, specifically (4) ownership by individuals
of tangible assets that cannot be revoked by a future government, (5) transparency
regarding accrual of those assets, so that workers know what they own, (6) market
valuations of assets as they are accrued so that rational planning for retirement can
take place outside of social security and so that (7) workers know how much their
wages are being taxed or subsidized by the social security system, (8) equity-like
returns on at least some of those assets, and (10) the opportunity for individuals to
make choices about the allocation of assets in their portfolio.
Our purpose is to find common ground between these two approaches that
preserves the core goals (1)-(8) of each, while compromising on portfolio choice (9)
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versus (10). We show that it is perfectly possible to convert social security into a
system of personal accounts, with irrevocable ownership of market priced assets, while
at the same time redistributing benefits based on lifetime income and sharing risks
across generations. We call this system progressive personal accounts. Moreover, we
envisage this system of progressive personal accounts automatically balancing the
social security budget.
There are two crucial ingredients in progressive personal accounts. First,
benefits would be awarded in the form of a new kind of derivative security that pays a
worker a life annuity that is proportional to the economy-wide average labor earnings in
his (statutory) retirement year. We call this security a Personal Annuitized Average
Wage security, or PAAW. This security explicitly delivers payouts that achieve risk
sharing across generations, since retiree benefits move in lock step with worker wages.
Second, PAAWs would be awarded based on worker contributions plus a government
match that is more favorable for workers with low lifetime earnings. This variable match
redistributes wealth, transferring benefits from those households with high realized
lifetime earnings to households in the same generation which have low lifetime
earnings.1
Opposition to personal accounts has arisen in part from the belief that personal
accounts would necessarily violate desiderata (1)-(3). We show that on the contrary,
progressive personal accounts are consistent with (1)-(3). Furthermore, we envisage
active market trading in PAAWs, and thus a continuously evolving market price for
PAAWs, giving PAAW owners a market rate of return. We shall argue that progressive
personal accounts also satisfy Republican goals (4)-(8). Thus they provide a clear
starting point for a bipartisan effort to reform and improve the current Social Security
system.2
A growing number of countries have moved away from the pay-as-you-go type
social security system still used in the United States. Some countries (e.g. Chile) have
1

Wealth redistribution from high lifetime earners to low lifetime earners can also be regarded as intragenerational risk sharing.
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Of course, care must be exercised in the implementation, as there is a danger that support for
progressive personal accounts might get transmuted during the political process into support for
traditional personal accounts that hold only stocks and bonds and have no government match.
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moved toward traditional individual account systems. Others (Sweden, Italy, and a
number of other European countries) have adopted notional defined contribution
accounts in which participants have “notional” account balances that earn a “notional”
rate of return, typically tied to the growth rate of wages. While progressive personal
accounts bear some relation to each of these, we argue that progressive personal
accounts are distinctly superior. First, they retain the intra-generational redistribution /
risk-sharing missing from both traditional personal accounts and notional accounts.
Second, they retain inter-generational risk-sharing, which traditional personal accounts
do not. Third, they provide account balances that correspond to market value, and
returns that are market rates of return, whereas notional accounts do not. For these
reasons, progressive personal accounts would put the United States system back in the
vanguard of managing lifetime financial security.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief overview of the tax and
benefit rules of the current system. Next, we define a PAAW as a security that pays its
designee one inflation-corrected dollar for every year of his life after a fixed date tR (the
year he hits the statutory retirement age), multiplied by the economy-wide average
wage at tR. PAAWs are of course new and unfamiliar securities, but they are not
fundamentally different from a host of other derivative securities introduced by Wall
Street in recent years. A household holding PAAWs is sharing risk with the next
generation, since higher wages for young workers in the future would imply larger
PAAW dividends. The PAAWs also protect against long life and inflation, since at
retirement they turn into indexed annuities.
Having defined a PAAW, we next show that the social security benefits promised
under the current system can be neatly summarized by the number of PAAWs a
household is entitled to. The current system is akin to a system of personal accounts in
which households accrue nothing until retirement, and then (based on their lifetime
earnings) suddenly accrue a large number of PAAWs that they can never sell. By
specifying an accrual rule that enables households to accumulate PAAWs as they work,
we show that it is possible to create a system of progressive personal accounts that
gives retired workers the same benefits as the current system, and also gives them
property rights over their PAAWs before retirement. At the very least, this demonstrates
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that there is no inherent contradiction between the current defined benefits system and
an appropriately structured personal account system.
We explicitly describe two accrual rules specifying how workers might acquire
ownership of PAAWs over their working lives. Both lead to ownership of the same
number of PAAWs at retirement as is promised by the current social security benefit
formula. The “fastest” accrual rule allocates property rights over PAAWs at the fastest
rate consistent with never having to take back a PAAW and reaching the current benefit
formula at retirement no matter what earnings history materializes. Though the “fastest”
accrual rule is the simplest, we recommend instead an alternative called the “straight
line” accrual rule because it makes the real tax or subsidy social security imposes on
worker wages more transparent.
Next we describe how a market in PAAWs could be developed. We argue that
PAAWs should be pooled, similar to the way individual mortgages are pooled by the
government agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and then traded.3 Investors would
not buy individual PAAWs, but instead a pro rata share of a large pool of them. To
eliminate adverse selection, and to guarantee a large, liquidly traded market, we would
oblige all households to sell a small fixed percentage (e.g. 10%) of their newly acquired
PAAWs into the pools. A liquid PAAWs market would establish a market price for
PAAWs, bringing the added transparency that comes with reliable valuations of assets.
PAAWs are tangible assets and thus, once accrued, difficult to revoke (4). Their
accumulation in personal accounts would make benefits already accrued completely
transparent (5). Once PAAWs became reliably priced by the market, the government
could even less easily expropriate the PAAWs held in personal accounts because
households would know exactly how much money they were losing (4). PAAW prices
would enable individuals to compute a market value balance sheet to facilitate their
financial planning (6). If the allocation of PAAWs per dollar of tax contributions followed
the straight-line rule we describe later, then workers would quickly and easily see the
true average match rate they faced (the percentage difference between the value of the
additional PAAWs added to their social security accounts and the social security taxes
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Agency mortgage pools (in contrast to subprime mortgages) have been one of the most successful
innovations in U.S. financial history.
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they paid), and statements could provide information on the marginal match rate as
well, giving the system much more transparency than it has now (7). And over long
time periods (e.g. 30 years), the increase in wages and the stock market are highly
correlated. Thus over long horizons PAAWs would earn equity-like returns (8), while in
the short run being far less volatile than equities as the worker approaches retirement.4
We also point out some additional benefits of a market for PAAWs. A liquid
PAAWs market would enable the government to observe the market value of its new
promises and its accrued social security liabilities. We argue that market value is a
better and less arbitrary measure of liabilities than actuarial value. Moreover, a market
for PAAWs would likely lead to a watershed in advancing annuities markets and other
retirement markets.
At the same time, by forcing personal accounts to retain 90% of their PAAWs,
including those awarded by the government match, we ensure that benefits are very
similar to those of the current system and that households with smaller lifetime earnings
get proportionately higher benefits (1). The holding of PAAWs also embodies the
Democrats’ desire for inter-generational risk-sharing (2) and inflation-hedged life
annuities (3). Of course 90% is an arbitrary figure that could be negotiated.
Republicans would tend to prefer more choice, and thus a lower number, and
Democrats might prefer an even higher number.5
The last part of our paper takes up the question of budget balance, at the
household level and for the system as a whole. Since the current Social Security
system contains no budget balance mechanism at either level, a progressive personal
accounts system that mimics the contributions and payouts of the current system would
not either. We argue that social security should be made self-balancing at the
aggregate level. This is especially important for plans such as this one that lock in
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The fact that PAAWs earn equity-like returns does not imply that shifting to personal accounts (these or
traditional ones) would raise overall rates of return on Social Security contributions. See Geanakoplos,
Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) and the discussion in Section IV below.
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If the only source of market-traded PAAWs were sales from personal accounts, then the percent of
PAAWs retained in accounts should be set low enough to lead to a liquid market in PAAWs. However, as
we describe later, the government could instead issue extra individual PAAWs and sell them directly to
pools in financial markets, leaving open the possibility that a liquid PAAW market could be created even
with workers retaining 100% of their PAAWs.
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benefits by enhancing property rights on accrued benefits. We describe a system such
that workers pay for their PAAWs with their social security taxes, augmented or reduced
by a government match similar in spirit to that arising from the straight line accrual rule
under the current benefit rules. But we impose the constraint that the total value of
social security taxes should be equal to the total value of PAAWs awarded.
To make the discussion concrete, and since PAAWs are not currently marketed,
we undertake a back-of-the-envelope calculation of their value. We simplify the
calculation considerably by assuming risk-neutrality and computing expected values of
payouts, but in related work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008) we treat valuation more
thoroughly and specifically incorporate the effects of systematic market risk.
Once we obtain estimated market prices for pooled PAAWs of every vintage, we
can value accrued PAAWs, and compare these numbers to the dollar contributions that
generate the accruals. We define the government match for a household as the
difference between the dollar value of extra PAAW accruals and the dollar value of the
extra contributions generating those accruals, and the match rate as the match divided
by the contributions. Depending on the accrual rule, this match rate may vary from year
to year for the same household.
The match rates for any accrual rule that mimics the current system are non-zero
for five reasons: a) the current system is not self-balancing, i.e. there is a disconnect
between contributions and benefit rules, which Congressional interventions have often
worsened, b) the current pay-as-you-go system uses part of current contributions to pay
off the legacy debt incurred by the early generations who received benefits far in excess
of their contributions, c) in the current system, the aggregate number of PAAWs
accrued in any given year does not depend on the aggregate level of current social
security contributions or on future wages, hence to the extent that current contributions
are unusually low (high) and to the extent it can be foreseen that future wages will be
much higher (or lower), accrued PAAWs will likely be worth more (or less) than
contributions, d) depending on the speed of accrual, households might get better or
worse annual deals when they are young or old, e) in the current system, households
with low lifetime earnings receive more PAAWs per dollar of contributions.
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There are a number of ways to make the system self-balancing, each of which
will by necessity alter the risk-sharing (and match rates) built into the current system.
We propose a mechanism that ensures aggregate fiscal balance “on the way in”, i.e.
that sets the market value of annual aggregate accrued PAAWs equal to annual
contributions, but that retains all the desiderata (1)-(8). This mechanism would
eliminate reasons a), b) and c) for non-zero household match rates, but retain reason
e), and possibly reason d) as well. This is consistent with the principle that households
making low lifetime contributions (because of low lifetime incomes) should get a positive
government match, and households with high contributions should get a negative
government match. Fiscal balance “on the way out” could be ensured by requiring the
government, or the private sector, to use the social security trust fund to hedge social
security liabilities.
As part of ensuring fiscal balance on the way in, we would first recognize the
legacy debt of the current system by giving PAAWs to all workers and retirees
according to what they have already accrued under the old rules. (Naturally what this
amounts to requires explanation.) This would represent new explicit debt to the
government. The government could finance future interest and principal payments both
by issuing new Treasury debt (i.e. rolling over the debt) and by raising general taxes. In
this way the legacy debt would be removed from the social security system and be paid
by all (current and future) entities subject to general taxes, like corporations and
investors earning dividend income, and not just by workers. We calculate that this tax
would amount to about 1% on all income. Then, every year from now on, households
would have to pay for their own PAAWs with their social security contributions, except
that the government match would redistribute contributions from workers with high
lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings. In the aggregate, the social
security system would then be fully funded and automatically balanced “on the way in”.
We estimate that at the current time, workers would be able to afford to buy just about
the same benefits that they are implicitly accruing in the current social security system.
The 1% general tax would thus enable a social security system that was in balance now
and that would automatically stay in balance “on the way in” in the future. Over time, of
course, the market value of the outstanding PAAWs would diverge from their original
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price. The government would have to hedge this risk, or as we explain below, engage
the private sector in doing so.
Related Literature
Our work is related to and builds on a number of other papers in the literature.
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) and Cushing (2005) compute the implicit marginal tax
rate of the current U.S. Social Security system. Below, we show the relationship
between their calculations of marginal tax rates and our calculations of marginal match
rates. Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999) discuss alternative ways to compute
accrued social security benefits, and Jackson (2004) describes a system of accrual
accounting that he argues would more clearly describe social security’s financial
situation. Feldstein and Liebman (2002) analyze the redistributive features of an
individual account plan with a two-tier contribution structure in which part of the inflows
are proportional to earnings and part are lump-sum contributions. Vickrey (1947) and
Liebman (2003) discuss the advantages of basing taxation on lifetime rather than
annual income. Valdes-Prieto (2000), Borsch-Supan (2005), and Auerbach and Lee
(2006) analyze notional DC systems, such as those adopted in Sweden and Germany,
and the self-adjustment mechanisms built into them.
A number of papers have proposed the creation of related new financial
securities. For example, Shiller (1993) proposes GDP-linked securities, Blake and
Burrows (2001) proposes longevity or survivor bonds, and Bohn (2002) and Goetzmann
(2005) propose aggregate wage-related securities. Valdes-Prieto (2005) advocates
creating “pay-as-you-go securities” (which would securitize the part of future social
security contributions that represents a net tax), and using them as a basis for social
security reform.
II. The mechanics of progressive personal accounts
In this section, we first briefly describe how the current U.S. Social Security
system works, i.e. the tax and benefit rules. We then show that it is possible to create a
system of individual accounts that exactly replicates the current system. This means
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that personal accounts can be compatible with progressivity and intergenerational risk
sharing.
In the current system the benefits received by social security contributors are
based on a concave function of lifetime earnings, providing smaller increments in
benefits with each additional dollar of lifetime earnings. While personal accounts as
typically implemented eliminate this progressivity, we show that this need not be the
case. Personal accounts can be made progressive simply by making annual PAAW
accruals depend on the size of accumulated past accruals. Later in the paper, we show
that this is equivalent to providing a variable government match (positive or negative)
where the size of the match depends on accumulated accruals to date.
Personal accounts, by virtue of being personal, would also seem to eliminate the
intergenerational risk sharing that is built into the current system. In the current system,
retiree benefits depend on the wages of the next generations of workers. As the young
do better, so will the old, and vice versa. If the personal accounts hold stocks and
bonds it is quite possible that retiree benefits will move in the opposite direction from
wages, at least for some cohorts. But there is no reason the personal accounts should
be confined to traditional investment securities. We explain that by holding PAAWs,
retirees will receive payouts that move in the same direction as the wages of the next
generation of workers.
A. The current system
We start by describing the current contribution and benefit rules for the U.S.
Social Security system; we ignore adjustments that would have to occur in the event
that the system is unable to meet its obligations. For simplicity, we focus on an
individual who will be single and childless throughout life, who will not become disabled,
and who will retire at the “normal retirement age” specified by Social Security.6
Program rules mandate that individuals and their employers together contribute
12.4 percent of all “covered” earnings, defined as earnings below the social security
earnings cap (the annual earnings cap equaled $102,000 in 2008). No contributions are
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See Section C2 below for a sketch of how the analysis could be extended to include spouses and
children (and their associated program benefits), as well as early or delayed retirement.
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collected on earnings above the cap. Of the 12.4 percent, 1.8 percentage points are
earmarked for disability coverage. In the analysis that follows, we ignore DI coverage,
and therefore use a social security contribution rate of 10.6 percent.
The benefits under the current system are a function of the worker’s lifetime
“covered” earnings history. An important feature of the system is that it is “wageindexed”: (1) the earnings that enter the benefit function are individual earnings in any
year divided by average economy-wide earnings in that year, (2) initial benefits upon
retirement are scaled by average economy-wide earnings in the statutory retirement
year, and (3) the earnings cap and the “bend points” defined below are adjusted so that
their ratios to the average economy-wide earnings remain constant over time.7 As a
result, the system can be described more easily and clearly by defining a set of
“relative” variables that are equal to the dollar amounts divided by average economywide earnings for the year. We define relative earnings for a worker in any year t as his
current covered earnings for that year divided by average economy-wide earnings, and
average relative earnings as the average of his highest 35 values of relative earnings.8
We can use these variables to describe the promised benefit structure of the
current U.S. Social Security system. Initial relative benefits are defined by the concave
function of average relative earnings given in figure 1a. Initial relative benefits are equal
to 90% of average relative earnings that are less than .24, plus 32% of average relative
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Average economy-wide earnings for a given year is the average across workers of annual labor
earnings in that year. (We use the terms “labor income”, “wage income”, “labor earnings”, “earnings”, and
“wages” interchangeably in this paper). SSA’s measure of average economy-wide earnings is the
Average Wage Index (AWI). They compute the AWI sequentially, by first constructing a “raw earnings
growth rate” g(t), and using this to construct the next AWI level, i.e. AWI(t) = (1+g(t)) * AWI(t-1). Various
techniques have been used over time to construct the raw earnings growth rate. Since 1991, the Social
Security Administration has calculated the “raw” growth based on employer-reported W-2 forms, summing
all earnings (including amounts above the Social Security earnings cap), including deferred
compensation, less distributions, and dividing by the total number of earners. From 1985 to 1990, the
measure excluded deferred compensation and distributions. Prior to 1985, growth was calculated using
earnings measurements provided by the Internal Revenue Service. Because the SSA has used varied
methods to compute earnings growth, the current level of the AWI series does not equal the level of “raw”
average earnings computed by the SSA. Under the current computation method, the AWI is about 4%
larger than the “raw” series. See Clingman and Kunkel (1992), Donkar (1981), and SSA (2006). Benefits
after retirement are indexed to the Consumer Price Index.
8

We ignore for simplicity the program rule that, in calculating average earnings over a career, earnings
prior to age 60 are indexed forward to age 60 wage levels using Social Security’s Average Wage Index,
while earnings from age 60 and after are included at their nominal levels. Our definition assumes all
earnings are indexed.
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earnings between .24 and 1.35, plus 15% of average relative earnings between 1.35
and 1.99.9
A worker’s initial dollar benefits (also referred to as the Primary Insurance
Amount or PIA) are paid at his statutory “normal retirement age” (NRA). They are equal
to initial relative benefits multiplied by average economy-wide earnings in that year.
Benefits in subsequent years are indexed to the CPI, so that individuals receive a
constant stream of real benefits for as long as they live.
Another way of describing the initial relative benefit function is to say that by the
end of their working lives, workers will fall into one of three lifetime earnings categories,
and that the marginal benefit a worker receives per dollar contributed in taxes depends
on his category. If a worker about to retire had increased his relative earnings in any
one previous year by Δ, he would have made extra tax contributions of Δ x 10.6%
(assuming a social security tax of 10.6%) measured in average wage units. (His dollar
contribution would be that number multiplied by the economy-wide average wage for the
year). According to the formula just described above, the worker thereby would have
increased his lifetime average relative earnings by Δ/35. For a worker with very low
lifetime earnings, this would have increased his initial relative benefits by .9 x Δ/35, as in
figure 1A. For this worker, the extra initial benefit per additional contribution (measured
in relative wage units is) (.9 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .24. For a worker with somewhat
higher lifetime earnings, the corresponding number is (.32 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .09.
For a higher earnings worker, the number is (.15 x Δ/35)/( Δ x 10.6%) ≈ .04.10 We
present these marginal benefit brackets in figure 2a.
Note that since benefits are determined by relative earnings, a temporary and
proportional increase in the earnings of all workers in any year t will leave unchanged
the benefits that those workers receive when they retire in year tR > t. The benefits of
individuals reaching the statutory retirement age in year t would be proportionately
higher in year t and each year they live thereafter.
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The points at which the slope of the line change are referred to as “bend points”. We ignore here the
rule that individuals must earn income in a minimum of 40 quarters in order to receive benefits.
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This exercise assumes that the increase Δ in relative earnings occurred in one of the 35 highest
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B. Defining new securities -- PAAWs
We define a Personal Annuitized Average Wage security or PAAW as a security
that pays its owner one inflation-corrected dollar for every year of his life after a fixed
date tR (the year he hits the statutory retirement age R), multiplied by the economy-wide
average wage at tR. PAAWs are tied to specific individuals (i) and to the year of the first
payout on the security (tR), and we use the notation PAAW(i,tR) to capture this.
We also define two other securities that could help in the construction and pricing
of PAAWs. First, we define a PANT(i, tR) (personal annuity unit) as a person-i-specific
“year tR annuity unit” as a security that pays one dollar in year tR and one inflationadjusted dollar in every subsequent year that the individual i is alive. Second, we define
an Average Wage(t) Security as a security with a single payout in year t equal to the
average economy-wide earnings in that year. An alternative way of describing a PAAW
is that it is a composite security that pays off one PANT(i,tR) for every dollar paid in year
tR by the Average Wage(tR) Security.
A PAAW (as well as a PANT or an Average Wage Security) is a derivative
security, similar to countless others that have been created in recent years by Wall
Street. Because the security is partly an annuity, it provides insurance for long life,
paying every year until death. Furthermore, because the payment depends on the
average wage at retirement, it creates risk sharing across generations. If young
workers are doing well and receiving high wages, the old will get higher payoffs from
their PAAWs, and conversely.
C. Translating the current system into an equivalent DC system
We are now in a position to translate the current system into an equivalent
defined contribution system, i.e. to show that by choosing a particular variable match,
and restricting accounts to hold PAAWs, it is possible to create a system of progressive
personal accounts that exactly mimics the promised taxes and payouts of the current
system. Replicating the current system may not be the best way to implement
individual accounts, but it serves as a starting point that allows one to compare and
contrast the current system (translated into the language of DC) with the more standard
relative-earnings years (otherwise there would be no incremental benefit).
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DC systems typically proposed. We argue that this is an important step toward
improving communication between the two sides of the current social security debate,
potentially easing the political gridlock that has occurred in the U.S.
In order to replicate the current system, workers would receive PAAWs in
exchange for their social security contributions, which they would hold in their personal
accounts; workers would be prohibited from selling them. Later we consider both the
advantages and disadvantages of allowing workers to sell some of their PAAWs in
exchange for other financial securities, and also the advantages of observing a public
market price for PAAWs.
To replicate the current system, workers and employers would (as in the current
system) together contribute 10.6 percent of earnings up to the earnings cap. The
government would credit each individual’s account with a number of PAAWs; the exact
number credited would depend (in a way to be specified) on current and past
contributions. At the normal retirement age, each PAAW would pay off a dollar amount
equal to the average wage in the economy in that year, and then in every subsequent
year of life, the same inflation-indexed real payment.11
The current system redistributes from rich to poor on the basis of lifetime income,
through the computation of benefits at the age of retirement. A natural question is
whether we can replicate this redistribution in personal accounts, where the benefits are
irrevocably owned by the account as they are earned, long before one’s lifetime
earnings can be measured. At first glance this seems impossible. But we show that by
making new accruals depend on accumulated balances, as well as new contributions,
we can indeed achieve the lifetime redistribution in the current system.
1. Computing accrued balances (total and incremental)
We define PBALit to be the number of units of PAAWs(i,tR) accrued by worker i
as of year t. There are actually many rules for the accumulation of balances PBALit that
can replicate the current system. The simplest is to define PBALit as the benefits
worker i would be entitled to under the current system given his earnings history up
through year t, and assuming all his future earnings were zero. Clearly with such a

11

Equivalently, at retirement each PAAW is transformed into a number of PANTs equal to the economywide average wage that year.
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definition PBALit can rise, but can never fall. There are other methods of accrual that
also end with the same amount at retirement and never fall, but among them our
definition accumulates balances most rapidly. We shall call it the fastest accrual rule.
Later in this section, we examine a second accrual rule that we refer to as straight-line
accrual.
Under the “fastest accrual rule” definition, progressive personal accounts can be
described by simply changing the units on the axes in figures 1a and 2a. These are
presented in figures 1b and 2b. For figure 1b, the Y-axis is now relabeled as PBAL.
For figure 2b, the Y-axis is “additional PAAWs per additional contribution” and the Xaxis is PBAL. (Since the PBAL function defined in Figure 1b is strictly monotone in
average relative wage, we can replace each average relative wage on the X axis of
Figure 2a with the corresponding PBAL, giving Figure 2b.) Figure 2b shows the extra
PAAWs divided by the extra contributions that together arise from working an additional
hour (holding constant the number of years of work), as a function of how many PAAWs
have already been accumulated. Additional PAAWs per additional contribution
(measured in relative wages units) is a decreasing function of PBAL, falling from .24 to
.09 to .04 as PBAL increases from less than .2 to more than .54.12
It might have seemed that our definition of PBALit would need to be a function of
all of worker i’s relative wages before year t. But Figure 2b makes clear that PBALit can
be rewritten as a function of just (PBALit-1, Contribution(t)), provided that for a
contribution coming after the first 35 years, only the excess of that contribution over the
35th highest relative contribution to date counts toward PAAW accrual.
PAAW accrual replicates the redistribution in the current system, and PAAW
accrual is a function of 1) new contributions and 2) accumulated balances PBAL. This
definition of PAAW accrual shows that we can award irrevocable benefits to young
workers and yet still make total benefits accrued at retirement depend on lifetime
earnings.
We illustrate how this accrual works in four examples, based on different
assumed age - relative earnings profiles. For worker 1 (the “economy average” worker),
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In the current system there is a 10 year vesting period, so we are referring here to workers in their 11th
year, or to workers in earlier years if we ignore the vesting requirement.
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we assume that earnings equal average economy-wide earnings in every year, i.e. that
relative earnings equal 1. For worker 2, (the “average earner worker”) we assume
relative earnings at each age equal average relative earnings at the same age for the
cohort of men born in 1937.13 For worker 3 (the “low earner” worker), we suppose that
relative earnings equal one-half the relative earning of worker 2. For worker 4 (the “high
earner” worker), we assume that relative earnings are 1.5 times the relative earnings of
worker 2. Our results are shown in Figures 3-5.14
Figure 3 plots additional PAAWs per additional relative contribution against time,
for each of the four workers. This can be interpreted as the extra PAAWs per unit of
extra contribution that would accrue from working an extra hour (holding constant the
number of years worked) now plotted against age. This graph shows how fast workers
move along the schedule in Figure 2b. The average earner and the high earner both
eventually move down to the .04 ratio, but the high earner worker gets there sooner.
The economy average worker and the low earner worker never earn enough to move all
the way to the .04 ratio. (The economy average worker starts at .24 ratio, and ends in
the .09 ratio. The low earner worker does the same, but takes longer to get to the .09
ratio.) Notice that there is no drop after 35 years, because earnings late in life are
always greater than or equal to the 35th highest. 15 Hence, on the margin, an additional
contribution would yield the full additional benefit.
Note that extra PAAWs are accrued due to increases in relative earnings (and
contributions). If the earnings of all workers rise proportionately (due to either higher
work hours or higher wages per hour), relative earnings remain unchanged and
therefore workers will not accrue any additional PAAWs as a result of this change.
In Figure 4, we illustrate the annual change in PAAW balances at each age for
the four workers. These graphs measure absolute increments over the year, rather
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We are grateful to Seung An from the Social Security Administration for providing us with the data on
average cohort earnings. These men earned more than the economy wide average at every age over 28.
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Although we have not done so, our approach could easily be extended to examine realizations of a
stochastic earnings process
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Note that it is purely by coincidence that worker 2 (cohort average) accumulates enough PAAWs to
drop to the .04 ratio at exactly the same date that the worker has worked 35 years. Thus the drop after
age 54 in figure 3 for worker 2 is unrelated to having worked 35 years at that point.
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than the increment per unit of contribution as in figure 3. They therefore take into
account the varying contributions due to the age profile of relative earnings. After year
35, a large fraction of each contribution does not count toward accrual – all that counts
toward accrual is the difference between relative earnings and the 35th highest relative
earnings.
Finally, in Figure 5, we look at the level of accrued PAAW balances (PBAL)
versus age. The average worker (worker 1) accumulates enough securities to receive
about 44 percent of the average wage in his first year of retirement. The cohort average
worker (worker 2) accumulates enough securities to receive almost 60 percent of the
average wage in his first year of retirement. The fact that this is less than twice the 36
percent accumulated by the low earner worker 3 (who earns half as much) illustrates
again the redistribution in the system.
2. Incorporating other social security benefits and features into
progressive personal accounts
In the analysis above, we focused on single individuals with no children who
retired at the normal retirement age with no chance of disability. We also ignored the
requirement that only workers with 40 quarters of positive earnings are eligible to collect
retirement benefits. We could extend our analysis to incorporate these minimum work
requirements, as well as spousal benefits, survivor benefits, early or delayed retirement,
and disability. For example, the accrual rules could be changed so that all PAAWs
become vested only after 40 quarters of work. In addition, spousal benefits could be
implemented through the creation of a separate spousal account. To replicate the
current system, the accrual of PAAWs in this account would depend on the current
contributions of both the individual and the spouse, as well as the accumulated
balances of each individual. The accounts would become vested only after 10 years of
marriage to match the requirement in the current system that divorced spouses must
have been married for 10 years or more to receive spousal benefits. Finally, individuals
wishing to retire later than age tR (the NRA) could be allowed to use their PAAW
payouts in the years immediately following tR to purchase additional PAAWs, and those
wishing to retire earlier than age tR could be allowed to sell some of their PAAWs to
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provide retirement income during the years prior to tR. These transactions could occur
at pre-specified prices (to correspond to the current system) or at market prices.
3. The assignment of property rights to accrued benefits
Under the current system, workers’ future social security benefits are not
protected with formal legal property rights. Congress can alter benefits, without regard
to whether they have been implicitly accrued under the current system.16 Our approach
would formally split future benefits into those accrued to date, and those yet to be
accrued, giving property rights, and reduced political risk, to the former but not to the
latter. Workers would get periodic social security statements telling them their balance
of PAAWs and their market value (assuming that there is a market for PAAWs, as we
discuss below) This treatment would enhance the ability of individuals to plan for their
retirement. It would also correspond more closely to the legal treatment of private and
state and local defined benefit pension plans.17
The assignment of property rights at the individual level leads to a natural choice
of accounting method for the system as a whole: accrual accounting. Under this
method, the present value of new accruals would be reported directly on the income
statement of social security. This would make the present value costs of a legislative
increase in social security benefits much more transparent than under the current
system (see Jackson, 2004, for a discussion of this and other advantages of accrual
accounting). As we describe later in the paper, the development of a liquid market in
PAAWs would take this one step further by allowing the government to report the
market value of new accruals (as opposed to an actuarial estimate of present value).
Assigning property rights to accrued benefits has potential disadvantages as
well. In particular, it reduces the flexibility that future Congresses have to reduce
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The 1935 Social Security Act stated “The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this Act is
hereby reserved to the Congress.” The right of Congress to reduce or eliminate benefits that are
scheduled to be paid as a result of previous Social Security contributions was re-affirmed by the 1960
Supreme Court decision on Fleming v. Nestor. See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/nestor.html for
further details.
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As in the current system, we would forbid the use of PAAWs held by workers in their private social
security accounts as collateral for loans. This is a necessary limitation on their property rights if we intend
to preserve their social security savings for their old age.

17

benefits in response to unexpected shocks. To reduce this cost, we propose later in the
paper that the system be made self-balancing on a present value basis, so that
decreases in revenue and increases in system costs are automatically compensated for
by decreases in accruals. We leave a full treatment of the advantages and
disadvantages of assigning property rights to future work.
4. Alternative accrual rules
As mentioned above, there are alternative accrual rules under which the benefits
of young individuals accrue less rapidly. The “fastest” accrual rule described above
corresponds to the benefits an individual would end up with in the current system if he
never worked again. For some purposes, such as considering a transition to a
completely new system, this accrual rule may be overly generous. Young workers,
even with maximal covered wages, accrue large numbers of PAAWs per contribution,
because their accrual is equivalent to a poor worker who had steadily earned very low
relative wages all through his life. A worker whose average relative wage for the first s
years is w would accrue f((w·s)/35) = f(w·(s/35)) PAAWs by the end of s years, where f
is the initial relative benefits function, exactly equal to a worker who earned smaller
relative wages of w·(s/35) per year but worked all 35 years. We therefore consider a
second accrual rule that we see as a natural alternative.
Instead of taking the sum of relative wages to date and dividing by 35, compute
the average relative earnings to date, put this value into the initial relative benefits
formula, and then pro-rate the benefits by the fraction of years worked to date (based on
an assumed 35 year work life). A worker whose average relative wage for the first s
years is w would then accrue f(w)·(s/35) PAAWs by the end of these years. Since f is
concave, with f(0) = 0, this second accrual is always smaller than the first, f(w)·(s/35) ≤
f(w·s/35) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 35. Figure 6 shows the accruals by age under each rule for a
hypothetical worker who always earns relative wages of 1.75 for the 35 years between
the ages of 20 and 55.
The second accrual method has the great advantage of not treating high wage
young people as if they were poor. Also, as shown in Figure 6, a worker who earned a
steady relative wage all his life would accrue the same number of additional PAAWs
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each year, moving up the straight line. For this reason we refer to this method as the
“straight-line” accrual rule.
This straight-line accrual method closely resembles that used by the Social
Security Board of Trustees to calculate the maximum transition cost measure of
unfunded obligations.18 The maximum transition cost measure is also the basis for
Jackson’s (2004) analysis of accrual accounting.
D. PAAWs vs. notional accounts
A growing number of countries, most notably Sweden, Italy, and Poland, have
recast their social security systems as notional accounts. Participants in these systems
make contributions to “notional” accounts, and the balances are legislated to earn an
interest rate that is generally set as a function of wage growth. At retirement, balances
are converted to a life annuity, based on cohort survival probabilities. These accounts
are called “notional” because balances do not correspond to any underlying assets and
returns are not those of a financial instrument. Notional accounts are by construction
partially self-balancing (see Valdes-Prieto, 2000, and Auerbach and Lee, 2006).
While PAAWs are similar in some ways to notional accounts, we think
progressive personal accounts would represent a significant advance. First, since
PAAW accrual is based on a redistributive, concave formula (modeled on the current
system), progressive personal accounts would retain the intra-generational risk sharing /
redistribution of the current system, whereas notional accounts as typically implemented
do not. Second, and more fundamentally, since PAAWs are bona fide securities, they
can be traded (as we will describe more clearly in the next section). In our view, a
balance should always correspond to market value and returns should correspond to
market returns. Market price, not notional balance, conveys useful information to
account owners and to the stewards of the social security system.
18

The maximum transition cost measure of unfunded obligations equals the present value of accrued
Social Security benefits payable after the current date, minus the present value of taxes on future benefits
minus the value of the Trust Fund. Accrued benefits of participants who are currently working are
calculated in the same manner as disability benefits (Goss, 1999), but then prorated by (age - 22) / 40
(see SSA, 2007). Benefit calculations for the maximum transition cost measure exclude the lowest n
years of relative earnings, where n equals the whole-number portion of min(5, years_worked/5). Our
accrual rule is based on the highest 35 years of relative earnings, with no exclusions allowed if there are
fewer than 35 years worked.
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III. Trading PAAWs
So far we have not allowed PAAWs to be traded or priced, and we have
replicated the current DB system, including its intra and inter-generational risk sharing,
with a system of progressive personal accounts. This has the advantage over the
current system of bestowing property rights over benefits as workers accrue them,
meeting one of the goals of the Republican push to reform Social Security. The PAAWs
will also make the accrual of future benefits very transparent, in contrast to the
opaqueness of the current system.
The trading of PAAWs from individual accounts is a step that need not be taken.
But if implemented in a measured way, it could provide further advantages.
A. The benefits of a market for PAAWs
The market price for PAAWs would provide important information to households,
governments, and other market participants. First, a market price for pooled PAAWs
would give people information about the market value of their own PAAWs, helping
them with their financial planning decisions regarding saving and asset allocation.
Second, a market value would make it more difficult for the government to take them,
thus further enhancing property rights. Third, the price of PAAWs would allow
households to compare the value of their tax contributions with the value of their
accrued assets. Fourth, the price of PAAWs would give economists a reliable guide to
the present value of the benefits promised by the social security system, a number that
is currently quite controversial. It would also help in designing policies that make the
system self-balancing. Fifth, the trading and pricing of PAAWs would enable the private
sector to play a more significant role in social security, as we shall see. Sixth, as the
pools of PAAWs mature, they turn into pools of individual annuities. As such, they
become a form of survivor or longevity bond that provide a market guide to aggregate
mortality probabilities.
There is another big indirect benefit from trading PAAWs. The social security
system embodies a gigantic contingent obligation from the government. The economic
system would be improved if a fraction of these obligations could be securitized and
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priced and made available as collateral for other obligations. PAAWs could be used as
collateral for issuing further annuities. We believe this would have a salutary effect on
the annuities markets and the reverse mortgage markets, which at the moment are
hobbled by inefficiencies and adverse selection.
Until a few years ago, financial markets may not have been able to process these
new securities. But given the recent advances in structured finance, Wall Street should
now be ready for them.
B. Implementing the trade of PAAWs via pools
One way to ensure volume in the trading and pricing of PAAWs would be to
require owners of the personal accounts to sell a fixed percentage of their new PAAWs
each year and purchase other securities with the proceeds. Workers would not be
allowed to spend the proceeds prior to retirement, nor would they be allowed to use
balances in their social security accounts (PAAWs or other securities) as collateral for
loans. They could either be required to purchase a specific basket of securities (for
example a broad-based equity index fund) or allowed to choose the securities or
baskets of securities that they wished to hold in their accounts.
As discussed above, portfolio choice is a dimension along which Democrats and
Republicans typically disagree. Republicans see choice as beneficial, while Democrats
see it as dangerous. Here, a compromise is conceptually easy to work out; one simply
restricts the degree of choice available within personal accounts. By keeping the
percentage of PAAWs sold each year to be rather low (say at 10%), personal account
holders would not be able to put the bulk of their social security benefits at risk.
An alternative approach would be for individuals to retain 100% of their PAAWs,
but for the government to issue extra individual PAAWs in proportion to those accrued
that year, and to sell these PAAWs directly to pools in financial markets. The
government could use the proceeds of the sale to retire other, more traditional, forms of
debt. Under this approach, the payouts from individual’s accounts would continue to
mimic those promised by the current system.
PAAWs (and PANTs) are individual-specific securities, paying as long as the
individual lives, so trading them presents many liquidity and adverse selection
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problems. They are thus analogous to individual mortgages, whose payments depend
on the individual’s decision to prepay or default (in which case the payoff also depends
on the individual’s home resale value). In the mortgage market these problems have
been overcome by the pooling of securities, and that is what we propose for PAAWs.
To be marketed efficiently, PAAWs should be pooled, just like mortgages. Investors in
the pool would not buy a single PAAW, but a pro rata share of all the PAAWs in the
pool.19
Let us denote by Pool(t, tR) the collection of all PAAWs issued in year t to
workers whose statutory retirement year is tR. This pool of PAAWs would consist of
PAAWs(i, tR) issued to over 3 million workers i. The prediction of PAAW payments for
any one worker i is fraught with uncertainty; but the pool is much less uncertain in
percentage terms.
Assume for now that the personal account owners would be required to sell
exactly the 10% of their newly accrued PAAWs we spoke of above. These would be
gathered into Pool(t, tR), and then shares would be sold off to investors, exactly as in
the mortgage market. A single price πt(t, tR) per PAAW would emerge for each pool,
even though the individual PAAWs (i, tR) would pay off differently, depending on the
idiosyncratic mortality of individual i. In the mortgage market, different homeowners,
with different propensities to prepay or to default, sell their individual specific promises
into pools. Shares in these pools are sold to the public. Investors are enabled to hold
liquid shares, and they need only predict the average default rates or prepayment rates
for the pools, not individual specific rates. The same would be true of pools of PAAWs.
Investors would only need to predict average mortality rates, for example. The shares
could be resold later at any time s > t for price πs(t, tR).
Once s ≥ tR , the pool of PAAWs effectively becomes a pool of PANTs. These
pooled PANTs would be a form of survivor or longevity bond.20 The current annuities
market is so hobbled by adverse selection and thin markets that it is hard to obtain a
19

Rather than pooling all individuals together, one could imagine creating separate pools for men and
women. All else equal, the price of the pool of women’s PAAWs would be higher, due to women’s higher
life expectancy. To offset this, the government would likely want to set higher match rates for women.
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For more on survivor or longevity bonds, see, e.g., Blake and Burrows (2001) and the literature that
followed.
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market forecast about longevity. The gigantic mandatory saving plan created by social
security provides a remarkable opportunity to improve this situation. The prices of the
pools of PAAWs and PANTs would be an invaluable guide to private companies wishing
to issue their own annuities, or reverse mortgages, making those markets more
efficient. It would also provide information about longevity to private firms with defined
benefit pension obligations. Annuity providers and DB pensions could hedge their
exposure to longevity risk by holding shares of pooled PANTs.
C. The private sector
Until now, we have imagined PAAWs as securities issued by the government to
individuals, with a fraction tradeable in pools among the general public. But it is also
possible that the private sector could issue a significant fraction, or even all, of the
PAAWs. A firm issuing x% of the total PAAWs P(t, tR) awarded in year t to workers
reaching retirement age in year tR would be responsible for delivering x% of the benefits
called for by that pool.21 Firms would compete with each other, offering to take on the
PAAW liabilities for the lowest price per PAAW. For every s ≥ t they would be required
to keep a margin collateralizing their obligations, based on the price πs(t, tR) of the
tradable government PAAWs of the same vintage. Workers would receive PAAWs from
the government and from private firms, but would only be allowed to sell the
government issued PAAWs.22 The collateral requirement should guarantee that the
privately issued PAAWs are just as secure as the government PAAWs. One could
further imagine creating a second pool PrivatePool(t, tR) of privately issued and tradable
PAAWs in addition to the pool Pool(t, tR) of PAAWs issued by the government.
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One complication is that a firm would have to rely on the government to inform it when workers in the
pool died. Information about deaths is also a requirement (and also sometimes a problem) for the current
social security system.
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To insure the safety of payments to retirees, the government should be held responsible for making any
payments the private sector failed to make. This would provide the government with the incentive to set
strong funding and collateral requirements.
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IV. Pricing PAAWs
To determine what the market price of a PAAW would be if it were traded, we will
need to introduce a model.23 We first examine the simplest model: one that assumes
risk neutrality. We then sketch out the beginnings of how one might construct a model
to compute pricing under risk aversion, leaving the implementation of this for ongoing
work.
A. Pricing PAAWs assuming risk neutrality
Under risk neutrality, the value of an individual PAAW depends on assessments
of 1) the growth in average wages, 2) the future path of interest rates, 3) individual
survival probabilities. For our calculations below, we assume a long-run growth in
average real wages of 1.1% and a long-run real interest rate of 3%.24 We use the
cohort life tables from Bell and Miller (2002) and assume for now that all individuals of
the same age face the same conditional survival probabilities25, i.e. that there is no
heterogeneity or private information about these probabilities.26 Finally we make the
assumption that the individuals are fully rational and have the correct expectations of
the average wage growth rate.
Based on these assumptions, we compute an estimate of the market price
πs(2000, 2047), measured in average wage units. Figure 8 shows the estimated price
of a PAAW across time (age) for individuals born in 1980, turning 20 in 2000, and hitting
the statutory retirement age of 67 in 2047. The market price of the PAAW, in date s
average wage units, rises steadily as s approaches tR, because a) the probability of
reaching the retirement age increases as any individual survives an additional year and
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Of course, once the market is thriving, one could simply observe market prices. But this still begs the
question of how market participants would price PAAWs.
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These equal the intermediate cost assumptions in the 2005 Social Security Trustees Report. The
assumptions in the 2008 Trustees Report are virtually the same: growth in average real wages of 1.1%
and real interest rate of 2.9%.
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For the calculations presented, we used the survival probabilities for males born in 1980.
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With heterogeneity in survival probabilities, the price of a representative pool of PAAWs would not give
a perfect signal to individuals about the market value of their individual future retirement cash flows.
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b) the real interest rate is greater than the growth in average real wages, so that one
year’s less discounting has a bigger effect than the increasing value of a wage unit.
Next, for each of the four representative workers, we compute (see Figure 9) the
total projected market value of accrued PAAWs (measured in contemporaneous
average wage units); i.e., the product of PAAW balances at any date s and the price at
date s of a PAAW πs(2000, 2047).27 These rise over time, for example to a value of 6.7
for the cohort average worker, meaning that the value of accrued balances at retirement
is expected to be 6.7 times average economy-wide wages.
B. Allowing for risk aversion
Pricing PAAWs by assuming risk neutrality could easily be misleading. In
ongoing work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008), we are examining model-based pricing
allowing for risk aversion. If PAAWs were a redundant security (i.e. the payoffs could
be perfectly replicated by holding a basket of other traded securities), this would be a
relatively straightforward task. For example, if the cash flows were always equal to the
cash flows stemming from a certain number of shares of the S&P 500, plus a certain
number of TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities), then one could simply price
PAAWs by looking at the market price of the shares of the S&P 500 and the investment
needed to acquire the TIPS. Of course it is not possible to perfectly replicate PAAWs
with securities that are currently marketed. An alternative approach (followed in
Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2008) is to project the return on PAAWs onto the returns of
currently traded securities and assume that the residual has price equal to zero.
Goetzmann (2005) found that wage growth and stock returns are uncorrelated, or
even slightly negatively correlated, over short periods of time. He concluded that stocks
would not figure much in a replicating portfolio for wage-indexed liabilities. While this
might be true for wage-indexed securities with very short maturities, this would not be
so for wage-indexed securities with long maturities. Common sense suggests that over
the long run real wages and stock returns must be positively correlated. For example, a
permanent drop in future productivity would likely lead to both lower future real wages
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Since we assumed that all workers have the same mortality, it follows that the prices of all accumulated
PAAWs are the same, πs(t, 2047) = πs(2000, 2047) for all 2000 ≤ t ≤ s.
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and a lower future value of the stock market, compared to what they would have been
otherwise. It is perfectly consistent that a rise in stock returns today does not signal a
higher wage today, yet does make it more likely that wages in 30 years will be higher.
Thus stocks would almost surely have a significant positive weight in the replicating
portfolio at time t for PAAWs indexed to wages at time tR much greater than t. As t
approaches tR, the replicating portfolio would change and stocks would drop out. In
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008) we model this long run correlation, and use Monte
Carlo derivative pricing methods to estimate the price of a PAAW.28
An alternative approach to pricing PAAWs directly would be to first estimate the
prices of the two underlying securities – Average Wage Securities and pools of PANTs,
and then use these to price the composite PAAWs. There is a literature in financial
theory indicating how, under certain conditions, it is possible to dynamically trade the
portfolios of two securities to replicate the product of the securities.29 We could apply
this approach to obtain the price of PAAWs as a function of the prices of average wage
bonds and pools of PANTs.
If the best replicating portfolio of currently traded securities leaves a residual that
cannot be assumed to have price zero, then one has to use an alternative asset pricing
model to assess the value of the residual. There are several models available for this
purpose, and one would need to check that the price of the residual is robust, or at least
that upper and lower bounds could be sensibly computed. We leave this for future
work.
Risk and return of PAAWs
As just discussed, in the long run wage growth is correlated with stock market
growth. Hence if PAAWs are priced in the market, they must offer equity-like returns in
the long run.30 But as workers age, and t approaches tR, PAAW volatility becomes very
28

This follows the work of Lucas and Zeldes (2006), who use this type of approach to estimate the market
value of private defined-benefit pension liabilities (PBO measures).
29

Amin and Bodurtha (1995) show how to price certain types of “quantos”: contingent claims with a
“quantity” or nominal cash flow determined by equity values in one currency but paid in another currency
at a fixed rate. For example, the value of a first security, such as the Nikkei stock index, might determine
the number of units of a second security, such as the U.S. dollar, that must be paid.
30
This is consistent with Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998). Equity-like returns are a feature of
PAAWs securities, but not necessarily of Social Security as a whole. Achieving equity-like (or any
market) returns for all of Social Security would first require eliminating its legacy debt, for example by
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low. For example, when t = tR - 1, the only payoff uncertainty is over what next year’s
real wage will be. All future payoffs are determined by that same number, and by
aggregate mortality. By contrast, even if investors can be fairly confident of next year’s
dividends, they will be very uncertain about dividends in 10 years, and stock prices at tR
are quite uncertain at t = tR – 1. If personal accounts hold only PAAWs, it will never
happen that two different cohorts retiring one year apart will get 20% different retirement
benefits, as could easily happen if investors kept their money in stocks and sold them
for annuities at retirement. PAAWs might thus turn out to be a more attractive
investment vehicle than stocks for individuals planning for retirement.
V. The government match rate (under risk neutrality)
Once PAAWs are priced, in any of the ways indicated above, we can compute
the government “match” under the current social security system (which can be positive
or negative, i.e. a subsidy or a tax) as the difference between the market value of
PAAWs received and the value of the contribution. The average match rate is defined
as [πt(t, tR) * (Δ PBAL) / annual contribution] -1 and captures the percentage by which
the social security system is subsidizing (or taxing if negative) account contributions in
each year. The marginal match rate is defined as [πt(t, tR) * (increment to PBAL per
additional dollar of contribution)] -1, i.e. the percent subsidy (or tax) for a marginal
additional account contribution. The match rate of course depends on which accrual
rule (fastest or straight line) we use.
Unlike most simple DC plans, the match rate is not constant across people or
time. It depends on PBAL, the price of a PAAW, and the fraction of a contribution that
"counts". The match rate can be positive or negative, but it can never be < -100% (i.e.
balances cannot be taken away). Note that all of the redistribution related to these
accounts occurs on the way in (i.e. as contributions are made); none of it occurs while
funds are earning returns or when they are withdrawn.
Figures 10 and 11 show the average match rate and the marginal match rate,
under the fastest accrual rule, for our representative workers, taking the price of PAAWs
increasing taxes outside of Social Security to pay off the interest and principle of the legacy debt. See
Section VI below.
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derived earlier from our risk neutral model. For the first 35 years of work, the average
and marginal match rates are identical, with the exception of those rare years containing
bend points. On average over the life-cycle, the match rates are quite negative. This
corresponds to the fact that the current system is primarily unfunded; current and future
workers are paying for the benefits given to the initial generations starting in the 1940s
who had not contributed much before getting benefits. Rather than getting low returns,
as they would under the current system, workers receive negative matches on their
contributions and then receive market rates of return on balances in their accounts.31
The match rates are positive for young workers and negative for middle-aged and old
workers. The average match rate is lower for the old for two reasons. First, under the
rapid accrual rule, a given relative wage contribution generates less PAAWs the higher
is PBAL, and PBAL rises with age, as we saw in Figure 3. Second, the 35-year
averaging formula means that earnings in the 36th year and beyond accrue PAAWs
only by the amount they exceed the 35th highest relative wage to date, so that an extra
year of work generates fewer additional PAAWs than it would if the worker had not yet
worked 35 years. (This second effect is not relevant for the marginal match rate in
Figure 11, because relative wages in later years are greater than or equal to the 35th
highest, so that an extra hour of work generates the full PAAWs increment.) These
factors are only partially offset by the fact that, as we saw in Figure 8, the price of a
PAAW rises with age.
We agree with our discussant Jason Furman that it would be desirable for our
match rate to inform each worker directly and simply about his incentives to work.
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) estimated the implicit tax rate on labor income (or the
extent of the work disincentive) due to the U.S. Social Security system, i.e. the
difference between the incremental contribution and the present value of the
incremental lifetime benefits due to a dollar increase in current income.32 They found it

31

Consistent with Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998), this negative match combined with market
returns corresponds to the lower-than-market rate of return received overall under the current system.
32
When earnings are stochastic, as opposed to deterministic, computing the incentive to work becomes
much more complicated, because one needs to incorporate the different possible earnings paths, and the
slope of the benefit schedule and the marginal utility of consumption under each path. The Feldstein and
Samwick calculations of the lifetime marginal tax rate of social security do not incorporate this uncertainty
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to be much higher for the young than for the old.33 This might seem to contradict our
generally declining marginal match rates in Figure 11 (a positive match corresponds to
a negative tax), but this is not the case, because the marginal match rates in Figure 11
do not give an accurate guide to the implicit marginal tax rate on labor income. Workers
who want an accurate assessment of the incentive to work under the fastest accrual
rule must make a more complicated dynamic calculation. Earning more when young
may accrue many PAAWs (which the match rate reveals), but the resulting increase in
PBAL lowers future match rates. Hence for young workers the true incentive to work is
much lower than the marginal match rate in Figure 11 suggests.34
Under the assumption that relative wages do not vary too much over a worker’s
lifetime, the marginal match rate from our second accrual method – the “straight-line
method” – is proportional to the implicit marginal tax rate on labor due to social
security.35 The marginal match rate under the straight line method therefore conveys
the correct incentive to work, without requiring any dynamic adjustment. Workers’
account statements could include either the value of the marginal match rate directly or
the inputs needed to compute it. The greater correspondence under this second
accrual method between the match rate and the incentive to work represents an
additional advantage of using the “straight-line” accrual instead of the “fastest” accrual
method.
Figure 12 and 13 show the average and marginal match rates under this straightline accrual method, and compares them to those under the fastest accrual method. A
worker with constant relative earnings (such as worker 1) will get the same PAAW
allocation per relative wage contribution all through his life (recall figure 6). Since
– their calculations simply assume that workers will end up on a specific segment of the PIA schedule
with certainty
33

Cushing (2005) showed that the decline largely disappears once one takes into account disability and
survivor benefits.
34

We are grateful to Jason Furman for bringing the importance of this issue to our attention, thereby
directing our focus toward the “straight line” accrual rule.
35

Formally, the worker’s average relative earnings to date must put the worker in the same bracket (the
range across which the slope in figure 1b is constant) as his average relative earnings at the end of his
career. Under this assumption, the implicit marginal tax rate from social security equals -1 times the
marginal match rate from the straight line method times the social security contribution rate. Note that the
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PAAW values rise as a worker ages (and survives), the match rate is steadily increasing
for this worker, i.e. a worker who always earns the same relative wage will have
increasing incentive to work an extra hour as he gets older.36 The average match rate
for the economy wide average worker starts out around negative 40%, meaning that for
every dollar of contributions he gets 60 cents of benefits. Since contributions are about
10% of wages, this means he faces an average tax rate on wages of around 4%. Since
the system is progressive, his marginal tax rate is higher than his average tax rate. As
the worker ages, the tax eventually turns into a slight subsidy.
VI. Incorporating budget balance mechanisms into Progressive Personal
Accounts
In this section, we show that our proposed system can be modified to incorporate
a market-based aggregate self-correction mechanism. There is a variety of ways to do
this. Here we focus on one in particular, in which we balance the system “on the way
in”, meaning that in any year the aggregate quantity of newly-issued PAAWs is set such
that their market value equals the aggregate value of new contributions. Assuming that
we start with an initially balanced system (and we describe possible ways to transition to
this), then the government should be able to optimally manage its portfolio to hedge its
exposure and maintain balance “on the way out” as well.
A. Transition
The first step is to recognize that in a pay-as-you-go system, the early
generations are given a huge windfall transfer. Retirees in the 1940s collected Social
Security benefits even though they hardly made any contributions. Similarly, retirees in
the 1950s collected benefits even though they had only contributed for 10 or 15 years,
and so on.37 In a pay-as-you go system, current and future generations of workers are

marginal incentive to work is the same under both accrual methods (while the marginal match rate is not).
36
The assumption in the previous footnote holds for workers 1 and 3 in Figure 13, and thus the marginal
match rate under this accrual method exactly captures the true incentive to work. For workers 2 and 4,
final average earnings turn out to be sufficiently higher than cumulative average earnings when young, to
put workers in a higher Figure 1b bracket than is used for computing the contemporaneous match rate.
In this case, the annual match rate when young does not correspond to the incentive to work.
37

See Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999)
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called upon to pay off those transfers. But why should this debt overhang be borne by
those least able to pay?
One approach would be to move rapidly to a new system by issuing “recognition
PAAWs” to current workers and retirees to compensate for (i.e. recognize) past social
security contributions. These would be obligations of the United States government,
and not of future social security contributors. Goss, Wade, and Schultz (2008) calculate
that the “maximum transition cost” (as of the beginning of 2007) would be $16.7 trillion.
Ignoring risk adjustments, this provides an estimate of the market value of the required
recognition PAAWs. There is no reason that the burden of this debt, created by the
transfers to the early generations of Social Security beneficiaries, should be apportioned
based solely on “covered” labor earnings. Payments of interest and principal on the
recognition bonds would therefore come both from issuing new debt (i.e. rolling some of
it over) and from taxes on all income, including labor income above the social security
earnings cap and capital income. Using a back-of-the envelope calculation, we
estimate that this burden would amount to about a 1 percentage point increase in the
tax rates on personal income and corporate profits in perpetuity.38
Because the current system does not legally ensure property rights on accrued
benefits, it might also be appropriate to give workers fewer recognition PAAWs than
would be implied by the accrual rule chosen for new contributions. By making this
reduction for current generations, the government would reduce the future tax rates it
would have to levy on future generations. There is a compelling case for such a
reduction. The current system of taxes and legislated benefits is not in fiscal balance,
and the shortfall has to be borne by somebody. There seems no reason to exclude the
current generations from bearing any of these costs. Under our plan future workers
would have to pay a tax on the order of 1%, or about 10% above their normal social

38

To obtain this estimate, we solve for the perpetual tax on personal income and profits that would be
equal in present value to $16.7 trillion, the SSA Office of Actuary’s estimate of the 2007 “maximum
transition cost” measure of unfunded obligations (UO). In formula, we need to solve for t such that (t * Y)
/ (r-g) = $16.7 trillion, where t is the tax rate, r is the real interest rate, and g is the growth rate of income
(GDP). This implies that t = (UO/Y)*(r-g). Based on the 2008 OASDI Trustees Report long-term forecast,
we assume a constant future real interest rate of 2.9% and future real income growth of 2.1%. Given
combined 2007 personal income and corporate profits of about $13.3 trillion, our assumptions imply a tax
burden of 1%. Note that these calculations do not incorporate any risk adjustment of the sort proposed in
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008).
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security tax. It seems fair to ask the current generations to accept a 10% reduction in
their social security benefits, especially since we will be locking in property rights to
these benefits. If we thought current benefits were still too large, or that the resulting
tax in perpetuity was still too high, we could reduce these benefits even more.
B. A fully funded social security system
Once this debt overhang is taken out of the social security system, there is no
reason the system cannot operate in fiscal balance going forward, as a fully funded
(“pre-funded”) system. We are thus led to propose a modification of the current benefits
rules which has the virtue of balancing the system “on the way in”. While the
government match under a system that maintains “balance on the way in” will by
necessity alter the redistribution / risk sharing of the current system, we propose to keep
such changes to a minimum.
On average, the present value of the social security contributions a cohort makes
under the current system is slightly greater than the present value of the benefits
mandated by current law. Thus workers could be made to buy their benefits via their
contributions without having to increase contributions or reduce future benefits. We
propose modifying the accrual rules, so that in every year the market value of PAAWs
awarded is just equal to the market value of all social security tax contributions. This
aspect is similar to what occurs with standard defined contribution accounts.
There are many ways to structure the government match such that the overall
budget balances on the way in. Here we focus on one simple possibility. For each year
t let the preliminary allocation of PAAWs be established exactly as in the current system
described in the previous section, say under the straight-line method of accrual.
Compute the total market value of this allocation in the PAAWs markets. Next, define λt
as the ratio of total annual tax contributions in t to the market value of the preliminary
PAAW allocation above. The final allocation of PAAWs is set by multiplying the
preliminary allocation by λt. This will result in an allocation of PAAWs that exactly
balances the budget. The government match will then be the difference for each
individual between the value of his final allocation of PAAWs and his tax contribution.
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Once the legacy tax is taken out and the PAAWs are scaled up to equal current
contributions, the government match rate looks much more generous. In Figures 14
and 15 we display the average and marginal government match rates (respectively) that
incorporate this budget balancing (for each accrual rule) for each of our four
representative workers. Values for λt are calculated using the assumption that the
cross-sectional age-income profile is flat (panel 1) or equivalent to the cohort-average
time profile (panels 2-4.) Figure 14 shows that average match rates are generally
above zero for the cohort average worker under straight-line accrual. Note in Figure 15
that, for straight-line accrual, marginal match rates are (weakly) less than average
match rates, and typically below zero for all but low earners.39
This revised budget balance system will be similar to the current system, but it
cannot replicate it exactly. For example, we noted that the aggregate accruals in any
year of the current system are independent of the aggregate contributions during that
year. In the budget balance system, the aggregate accruals would move dollar for
dollar with contributions.
Another difference is that in this revised system, the quantity of PAAW accruals
in a year depends on the market price of PAAWs in that year, whereas in the current
system it does not. In the current system, the number of PAAWs a worker gets is
independent of interest rates. In the budget balance system, when long run interest
rates fall relative to the long run expected growth in wages, PAAW prices will rise, and
workers will therefore get fewer PAAWs.40
C. Maintaining balance through hedging
Since PAAWs promise future payments that are uncertain as of the time they are
issued, their eventual value may diverge from their original price. Thus a system in
balance on the way in may fall out of balance later. So we suggest that there is a need
for a hedging entity to keep the system in balance. One possibility is to create a
39

The wedge between marginal and average match rates exists because workers earn additional benefits
each year even if they have no additional earnings, which boosts the average match rate but not the
marginal match rate. This wedge will exist for "straight-line" accrual with any concave benefit schedule.
40

A complete analysis of intergenerational risk sharing would have to take into account interest rate risk
in addition to wage risk.
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government agency with this responsibility. Another complementary possibility would
be to involve the private sector in issuing PAAWs that would be sold to households, i.e.
pay firms to take on the obligations. As described earlier, the private firms would of
course need to be regulated and monitored to ensure that they fully collateralized their
obligations. We leave a full description of this hedging for future work.
VII. Conclusions and future research
We showed that it is possible to preserve the redistribution and risk sharing of the
current system in a system of progressive personal accounts, clarifying the link between
contributions and benefits, and at the same time enhancing the property rights of the
system. Along the way, we translated the current DB system into the language of DC –
facilitating communication in the debate over individual accounts.
We developed a variable match approach to provide progressivity based on
lifetime (rather than annual) income. This approach could also be used to modify
standard personal accounts (holding traditional financial assets) or notional defined
contribution accounts that have recently been adopted in a number of other countries.
We argued that it would be possible to create and trade pools of PAAWs,
providing an estimate of the market value of each individual's account and opening up
the possibility of allowing (limited) trade in accounts. These new markets would have
an enormously beneficial impact on the current annuities and reverse mortgage
markets.
We emphasized the importance of making the social security system selfbalancing by incorporating a market-based aggregate self-correction mechanism. We
described one possible way to do this through “balancing on the way in” and system
hedging.
This paper lays the groundwork for our ongoing and future work in this area. In
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008), we present a model for estimating PAAW prices under
risk aversion, taking into account a long-run link between aggregate labor earnings and
the value of the stock market. We then use these prices to calculate the market value
of aggregate outstanding U.S. Social Security benefit promises. Our resulting estimates
of the “maximum transition cost” measure of system obligations are significantly lower
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than those of the Social Security administration, due to our incorporation of market risk
into the discounting of future benefits.
In other work, we are trying to further improve the risk-sharing and redistribution
features of our progressive personal accounts, and we are also examining alternative
market-based self-correction mechanisms. We are working to spell out in more detail
how our proposed market for PAAWs and related new securities would operate in
practice. Finally, we hope to investigate the relevance of progressive personal accounts
to private pension plans.
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PBAL Under Two Accrual Methods
(for a worker with relative earnings of 1.75 for all ages)
0.70

Age 55

PAAW balance (PBAL)

0.60

Age 50

"Fastest"
Accrual Method

0.50

Age 45
Age 50

Age 40
0.40

Age 45

Age 35
0.30

Age 55

Age 40

Age 30

"Straight Line"
Accrual Method

Age 35

0.20

Age 30
0.10

0.00
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

Total relative earnings to-date/35

1.50

1.75

2.00

Figure 7

PBAL Under Two Accrual Methods
1.2

Worker 1: Economy Average

0.5

Relative Wage
1

0.8

Worker 2: Cohort Average

0.6

1.6
0.4

"Fastest"
Accrual Method

1.8

0.5
1.4
1.2

0.4

0.3
1

0.6

0.3
0.8
0.2

0.4

0.6

"Straight Line"
Accrual Method
0.1

0.2

0.2

0.4
0.1
0.2

0

0.0

0

Age
0.9

Worker 3: 0.5 Cohort Average

0.0
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62

20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64

Age
0.4

3

Worker 4: 1.5 Cohort Average

0.8

0.8
0.7

2.5
0.7

0.3

0.6

0.6
2
0.5

0.5
0.2

0.4

1.5

0.4
0.3
0.3

1
0.1

0.2

0.2
0.5
0.1

0.1
0

0.0
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62

Age

0

0.0
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62

Age

Figure 8

Projected market price of one PAAW
(under risk neutrality, measured in average wage units)
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Projected Market Value of Accrued PAAWs
(measured in average wage units)
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Average Match Rate
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Marginal Match Rate
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Average Match Rate Under Two Accrual Methods
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Marginal Match Rate Under Two Accrual Methods
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Average Match Rates Under Automatic Balance
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Figure 15

Marginal Match Rates Under Automatic Balance
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